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RESTRICTED 
STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE NAVY; 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
An address delivered by 
'Vice Admiral Donald B. Beary, U.S.N. 
at the National' War College 
16 February, 1950 
General Bull and Officers of the National War College, I 
consider it a distinct honor to be invited to address such a highly 
selected group of officers. I must admit, however, that I was some­
what confounded when I received the suggested topic for my re­
marks, which was "Strategic Employment of the Navy; Past, 
Present and future". We have in our library many thousands of 
volumes covering the subject and to think that I could summarize 
them in a fifty minute talk is somewhat overcoming. However, i 
will try to give some of the most important points, generally con­
fining my remarks to World Wars I and II and future employment of 
the Navy. 
The basic fundamental mission of the Navy in the past and it 
will continue to be so in the future is to gain and maintain con­
trol of the sea lanes vital to our war effort and to deny to the en­
emy the sea lanes vital to him. 
By April 6, 1917, when we entered World War I, the Brit­
ish Navy had contained, though not destroyed, the German surface 
Navy, and our contribution to this containment was the sending of 
the 6th Battleship Division to·augment the British fleet. Our prin­
cipal effort was expended in combating the enemy submarines. You 
all know the outcome. As far as the Navy was concerned, the war 
was between surface and sub-surf ace craft. Shipborne air did not 
enter into it. 
Vice Admiral Be�ry is President of the Naval War College. 
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During the period from the end of the war until. 1933 we 
witnessed the rapid disintegration of our navy through armament 
limitation agreements and drastic curtailment of funds. Ship con­
struction practically ceased; research and development were seri­
ously curtailed and non-existent in that m:ost important develop­
ment which, though hampered by limited funds, made progress, and 
in March 1922 we had our first aircraft carrier, the converted col: 
lier, LANGLEY. 
The period from 1933 to 1941, when we suddenly found our­
selves in a war on two fronts, witnessed the slow but gradual build- . 
up of our navy, including destroyers, cruisers, battleships and car­
riers. The tempo increased with the rapid deterioration of the 
world international situation until the J aps bombed Pearl Har­
bor, when the sky was the limit. 
Though the Navy suffered terrific losses at Pearl Harbor, 
we were lucky 'in one respect and that was that not one of the 
seven aircraft carriers in commission was damaged. W-e had been 
knocked to our knees but were not out. 
Our basic military strategy as approved by the President was 
that initia�ly our major military effort would be made in the Euro­
pean theater, while holding or defensive operations were con­
ducted in the Pacific. We had lost control of the seas. Our 
Navy had been so seriously crippled and was so definitely inferior in 
power to the Jap Navy that there was no other answer. There-· 
fore, until the Navy could accomplish its mission of. regaining and 
maintaining the control of the sea lanes essential to the conduct 
of the war we had to assume a defensive position. 
As in World War I by the time we entered the war the 
British Fleet had contained the German surface Navy, which re­
quired an all out effort on its part; therefore the Japanese Navy 
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became our sole responsibility and we were not in a position to meet 
it head on. The best we could do was to conduct a few raids, hit and 
run operations. 
However, the extremely rapid advance of the Japs south­
ward through New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, which vitally 
threatened our line of communications with Australia, forced us 
to do something drastic to stop them. 
This something was the Battle of the Coral Seas on the 7th 
of May, 1942, followed by the Battle of Midway on June 4th, 1942, 
We sustained losses in these two battles but the enemy was so 
severely punished that her great superiority was reduced almost to 
equality with us. Our strength was growing rapidly. New con­
struction and trained personnel to man our ships and planes were 
being produced at a rate the enemy could not equal. We were on 
our way to gaining control of the seas. 
On August 7, 1942, we landed on Guadalcanal and, though 
the fighting was bitter and we took heavy losses, we stuck. The 
southward movement of the Japs was stopped, and we were now in 
a position to start the long drive to Tokyo. 
The grand strategy for this campaign consisted of two major 
efforts: 1st, a drive northward under command of General Mac­
Arthur, through New Guinea to the Philippines; and 2nd, a drive 
westward under Admiral Nimitz to Okinawa. After these pre­
liminary objectives were seized and consolidated they were to be the 
jumping off places for the final assault on Japan. Fortunately, 
after we had seized them the Japanese sued for peace on August 
15, 1945, and the final step, the invasion of Japan, was not neces­
sary. 
RESTRICTED 8 
3
Beary: Strategic Employment of the Navy; Past, Present and Future
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
The above plan of campaign required the use of. amphibious 
operations on a scale never attempted before. The prerequisit� 
/ i -
for success of these operations was control of the vital sea lane�, 
including control of the air over them. It required the accomplish� 
ment of something which many people said could not be done and 
that was that ship-based air power could not successfully �mbat 
and neutralize shore-based air power. The Navy did it. 
So much for the first part of the Navy's mission, that is, the 
gaining of control of the sea lanes vital to ou.r efforts. How about ' 
the second part, that is, denying to the enemy the sea lanes vital 
to hitn? 
From December 7, 1941, until the end of the war our sub­
marines did an outstanding job and accounted for the major effort 
in this regard assisted by occasional air and surface raids. With our 
seizure of the Philippines and Okinawa the long essential life line of 
the Japanese to Malaya and Indonesia was cut and the Japanese 
had lost the war through inability to support her military forces 
and feed her people. 
They started the war with about 7,000,000 tons of merchant 
shipping. They captured and built about 3,000,000 tons during the 
war, which gave them a total of about 10,000,000 tons. At war's 
end they had only about 1,500,000 tons left and only 750,000 tons of 
this was operable. There were only about 500,000 barrels of fuel 
oil left in all Japan, so you can readily see how effectively we had 
cut their vital sea lanes. As a matter of comparison our fast 
carrier task force used as much as 140,000 barrels of fuel oil per 
day. In other words, the Japanese had only three days supply of 
oil left on VJ day based on our consumption rate. 
This forcibly demonstrates that a nation's sea power is com­
posed not only of her combatant ship strength but of equal im-
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portance is her merchant shipping. This fact is frequently dis­
regarded. 
So much for our naval strategy during World War II in the 
Pacific. Turning to the Atlantic, as I have said before, the Brit­
ish had contained, though not destroyed, the German surface Navy 
by the time we entered the war. The fight in that theatre was 
against their submarines. It was a tough battle and at one time was 
almost lost, but with the great improvement in detection devices, 
the tremendous increase in the numbers of escort vessels, the in­
troduction of "Hunter-Killer" tactics and more effective use of 
land-based air, we, the British and ourselves, were able to suc­
cessfully combat the German submarines and maintain control of 
the seas. 
The lesson we have learned from two world wars is that the 
submarine is a most important threat to our control of the seas, 
and that the introduction of faster under-water speeds and ability 
to run submerged for long periods of time have greatly increased 
the difficulties of successfully combating them. In my opinion it 
is the most important problem that confronts the Navy. It is one 
which must be solved and will require all the brains, talent and 
money we can get to solve it. I will refer to this later. 
So much for the strategy and mission of the Navy during 
the past two great wars. What about the future employment of 
our Navy? 
There is a vociferous, fanatical group of people in this 
country, who unfortunately receive more attention than their cause 
deserves, who say that air power has sunk the Navy and ships that 
sail on the surface of the seas. This is not true and all history re­
futes it. Some of these same fanatics say, "We don't care any­
thing about history; we make it." I cannot believe that any sound, 
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logical, sane, educated person would make such a statement or be,. 
lieve such a thing. 
All progress that man has madein whatever form of�science, 
engineering, art, living, government, etc., is a direct result of past 
trials and.errors and·suceesses. Naval science is no exception. The 
wise man learns and profits from the past and applies his knowledge 
to the present and the future. 
The end of World War II brought about a situation in 
naval affairs that had its most recent parallel during the Napoleonic 
Wars. At that time Napoleon had organized the States of West­
ern Europe jnto a continental alliance that was opposed by a single 
dominant sea power-Great Britain. After the defeat of the Com­
bined Fleet at Trafalgar, Europe faced a long period during which 
the naval strength of the continental powers could be employed 
only in the ''guerre de course"-war upon commerce.i The "guerre 
de course" is the classic weapon of the weaker sea power, but it 
will not win wars. After Trafalgar, England bottled up what was 
left of. the French Fleet in its home ports by means· of blockade, 
and her sea power was opposed only by such scattered forces as 
were able to skirt the blockade and prey on British merchant ship­
ping. Thus, absolute sea power, in a manner of speaking, was op­
posed to absolute land power. But the dominant sea power was 
without the physical means to settle the issue on the, continent; 
she lacked the resources in -fuen and material necessary . to prose­
cute land warfare on a large scale. And her continental adversary 
could not bring to bear against her its vast resources in land 
strength so long as it lacked sea power. 
Thereafter, Great Britain recognized it as her cardinal pol­
icy to pr�vent the rise on the continent of a single dominant power 
that might some day utilize the far greater resources of Europe 
to outbuild · her at sea. Britain steadfastly pursued this policy 
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right up until World War II, employing the weight of her in­
fluence and the pressure of her sea power to intervene in Europe 
and so preserve the balance of power on the Continent. 
Today, the cycle has reached full turn. A single con­
tinental power has arisen in Europe that threatens to exclude the 
Western democracies from the Eurasian Continent. That power 
is opposed by a complex of States that rim the Atlantic Ocean. The 
backbone of that complex is the sea power of Great Britain and the 
United States, upon which all the rest depends. Except for its sub­
marine arm--of which more later-the naval strength of the con­
tinental power is not great enough to make a serious bid for com­
mand of the seas. 
This state of affairs has created in the minds of many per­
sons a dangerous misconception-some of whom, indeed, may be 
responsible for the formulation of our national strategy. That 
misconception is that sea power cannot be fully effective unless it is 
opposed by sea power, weapon for weapon. The belief is widely 
held that if the Soviets do not have capital ships, then we do not 
need them; if they lack the striking power of carrier air, then 
this weapon has no place in our arsenal; and that it is sufficient 
simply to counter our opponent where he can strike us at sea, 
namely, by defeating his submarine fleet. 
I assure you, gentlemen, nothing could be farther from the 
truth. 
As I have said before, the Mission of the Navy in war can 
be reduced to a very plain statement: to make safe for our use the 
sea lanes we need and to deny to the enemy the sea lanes he must 
use to fight the war against us. Out of this simple Mission grows 
a multitude of tasks that require the use of many weapons. i:t will 
be my purpose here to state those tasks to you and to demonstrate 
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how the Navy can-and, I trust, will-carry out those tasks jf an­
other war is forced upon us. 
It is helpful, I think, when reviewing our overall strategic 
situation, to hold in mind a polar projection of the northern hemis­
phere centered somewhere near Moscow. The European penin­
sula is adjacent on the north, west, and south to waters of the At­
lantic, or waters tributary to it. To the southward of the Eura­
sian land mass, the Persian Gulf knifes in from the Indian Ocean 
to a point within a thousand air miles of Soviet industrial centers 
in the Caucausus and on the Caspian Sea. To the east, Siberia and 
China front the Pacific Ocean. Wherever the coasts of Europe and 
Asia meet the sea, Soviet power stops and ours begins. Thanks to 
Anglo-American sea-air power, the broad surface of the seas is 
denied to the enemy and is open to our use so long as we are able 
to defend our shipping from the enemy's submarines and his 
land-based air. 
At the present time, as you well know, we hold important 
strategic positions around the Eurasian continent from which our 
military strength could be projected against the Soviet Union. At 
the outset of any war, we shall hold an important lodgment in 
Western Europe. Whether we can successfully maintain a foot­
hold on the continent of Europe against the full weight of Soviet 
land power must, of course, be determined by the event. We 
believe that we can do so; and we are making heavy investments in 
the Atlantic Pact nations to make that expectation a reality. 
Outside the continental limits of Europe and Asia, we are estab­
lished in the British Isles, in other islands of the Atlantic, in 
north and east Africa, and at scattered points along the fringes 
of central and southeast Asia. We face the Soviets in eastern 
Asia and in the Japanese Islands and Okinawa. 
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Thus, the entire Eurasian land mass is ringed by a serie-J 
of positions from which heavy blows could be directed anywhere 
against objectives on the Continent. In this situation there is dem­
onstrated the classic weakness of a strong land power opposed by a 
sea power having limited land strength. The land power cannot 
invade the territory of its opponent since it cannot transport its 
ground forces overseas. Although it may strike its enemy through 
the air, and indeed deal him fearsome blows, it cannot make their 
final by the ultimate invasion of his homeland. When ranged 
against a strong sea power, the land power can gain at the most 
only a stalemate. With this it must be content, since the oceans re­
main an effective barrier against the movement of troops in great 
force. 
Not so, the sea power. The flexibility of action that is af­
forded by control of the seas permits the sea power to deliver its 
main thrust--or a series of thrusts-from any direction. The 
enemy cannot be strong everywhere, and he cannot know forcer­
tain from whence the blow may fall. By the economy of the 
limited force that is available to it, the power that commands the 
sea can direct that force so as to obtain its maximum effect. 
These principles apply whether the force used be strictly 
carrier strikes on coastal objectives, long-range strategic air at­
tacks from peripheral bases, or amphibious invasion. Although 
the continental power retains the advantage of interior lines, they 
may prove of little value if its forces are over-extended and cannot 
be transported in time to meet the threatened attack. 
It would seem, therefore, that our basic strategy, in the case 
of a war against the Soviets, would be to preserve the sort of a 
condition I have just described. If we are ultimately to inter­
vene with ground troops on the continent of Europe-and it appears 
inevitable that we would have to do so-then such an interven-
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 tion should be made only after the enemy has been seriously w�k-
ened by blows delivered with sea and air weapons from peripheral 
bases. 
It would be unwise to the point of folly, however, to assume 
that such a strategy is not apparent to our opponent or that, he 
will not do everything in his power to nullify it, if and when he, �r .
cides upon war. Having recognized that strategic air attacks m�y 
be carried out from advanced Allied positions against his in­
dustry and communications, it may well be that the enemy's first 
move in the event of war will be to capture or neutralize these 
positions. 
This, he has the capability of doing. True enough, the 
Soviets could neither hold nor support overseas positions in _the 
face of the pressure we could ultimately bring against their com­
munications, but, for a time, an initial move of this sort might 
have desirable effects. Such an opening move could conceivably 
take the form of an. atomic blitz against Britain, coupled with air­
borne and air-supported attacks on Iceland and our North AfriGan 
positions. In such a case, the effect of any pla:qned retaliatory blow 
would be seriously reduced. We would be for�ed to rely on North 
American bases and such advanced bases as we might continue 
to hold for the support of an initial strategic bomber offensive. 
Thereafter, we would be faced with a long, uphill pull to re-estab­
lish our forces at locations close enough to enemy targets to make 
the employment of our air power both effective and profitable. 
It will be clearly apparent to you that the support and reten­
tion of overseas bases will depend upon the ability of the fleet to 
keep open the lines of communications with those bases. The en­
emy will have at his disposal two primary weapons to prevent 
our doing so. One of these is the submarine; the other is land-based 
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air, where it can be brought within range of the sea routes our 
ships must use. 
As to the submarine, it is gratifying to observe the attention 
that is now being given to that problem and to note the agreement 
so widely reached that we must make a major effort toward its 
solution. Although I am unable to say to you that any final solu­
tion is as yet in sight, the means of detection and the weapons 
for use against the submarine are well in advance of those available 
at the end of the last war. 
There is a tendency, I fear, on the part of the public-and 
some members of the military-to over-emphasize the potentialities 
of the submarine and to overlook some basic disadvantages attend­
ant on its use as a primary weapon in the war at sea. 
The submarine is, fundamentally, a weapon of the "guerre 
de course". Commerce raiding has held a fascination for weaker 
naval powers throughout the history of naval warfare because of 
its cheapness. But it has never decided the issue in a major war. 
The British tried it themselves in the Anglo-Dutch War, when 
Charles II sought to gain a cheap victory over the Dutch and their 
French allies by preying on their commerce. This war ended, how­
ever, with a fleet of Dutch ships in the mouth of the Thames. 
During the war of the Spanish succession, the French devoted all 
their efforts at sea to the raiding of British commerce. Although 
the British lost hundreds of ships, their trade increased neverthe­
less, and French shipping all but disappeared from the seas. Mahan 
roundly condemned commerce raiding as a poor substitute for 
fleet action. His studious disciples, the Germans, placed primary 
reliance upon it as a means of naval warfare in both World Wars. 
Today, we have not yet found completely satisfactory meth­
ods of combating the most advanced types of submarines. But it 
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is by no means clear that the Soviets will be able to employ them 
effectively against the opposition that even now we are able to 
offer. 
The task of the submarines has been greatly complicated 
by new developments. As you know, the Germans found it neces­
sary to give their submarine crews long and intensive training 
periods in the Baltic in order to fit them for warfare against our 
convoys in the Atlantic. The shortening of their training periods, 
enforced upon the Germans during the latter stages of the war, 
was a great source of apprehension to Admiral Doenitz. The sub­
marine that we shall combat in the next war will require of its 
crews even greater technical proficiency than was attained by our 
recent enemies in the last. Whether or not they are capable of 
attaining this skill only time will tell. We should not discount it 
too much. 
So far, we have developed no acceptable substitute for the con­
voy nor for the "hunter-killer" tactics so effectively employed toward 
the end of the last war. We have, however, improved both our 
weapons and our techniques in the prosecution of these methods of 
anti-submarine defense. And other methods now under research 
and development give even greater promise of a final answer to the 
submarine problem. 
But convoy and passive protection of shipping alone is not 
enough. In the first instance, it surrenders to the enemy the initia­
tive and leaves him free to devise new methods of attack when old 
ones have failed. In the second, it forces upon us the need to pro­
vide shipping with greater and greater protection as enemy offen­
sive measures become more effective. And, finally, it permits the 
enemy to increase the size of his concentrations against us, since 
passive defense has no effect on his ability to build more sub­
marines. 
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Therefore, as a corollary to convoy and "hunter-killer" cover, 
we must take up the offensive against enemy submari�es before they 
leave their ports. We have numerous means of doing this. Many 
of them lie within the sphere of strategic bombing-particularly 
those that embrace attacks on building and assembly yards. But as 
the finished product nears the sea-when the fitting out and train­
ing stage commences-then, it may be within the power of the 
fleet to intervene. 
We shall seek to prevent the enemy from testing his boats 
and training his crews in sea areas that are adj.acent to the oceans. 
We shall mine his harbors and their exits, both by aerial and 
submarine laid mines. And we shall attack him from the air 
while his undersea craft are still in their pens. All of these are 
measures that not only may require the mobility and striking pow­
er of shipborne air, but are measures also to which it is especially 
adapted. It would, of course, be a mistaken and uneconomical use 
of sea-air power to carry out an offensive of this nature where en­
emy training areas, harbors, and bases are within the effective 
cover of land-based air. But in regions inaccessible to land-based 
aircraft capable of precision attack missions of this kind, aircraft 
from carriers may well be th_e only weapon that can do the job. 
As to the enemy's land-based air, we can expect it will be 
employed against our merchantmen much the same as it was in 
the last war. The Germans used long-range reconnaissance aircraft 
to locate convoys at sea. When a convoy was found, the position 
would be relayed by radio to submarines best disposed to attack. 
Thus, it would seem that some form of aerial reconnaissance will be 
necessary if Soviet submarines are to be employed advantageously. 
This means we shall have to screen our convoys against being 
scouted by the enemy's land-based air. It will not be an easy job 
to do. Limited, close-in screening can be carried out from escort 
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carriers, but, in view of the enemy's ability to install radar in his 
scouting aircraft, it is highly doubtful if we will be able to con-
ceal the location of our convoys. 
An obvious alternative would be to destroy the) Ememy's re­
connaissance aircraft at its coastal bases. In some instances, it 
should be possible to do this by land-based air strikes, provided 
their are friendly fields within range. Elsewhere, fast carrier task 
force strikes will be the only means of getting at these air�raft. On 
the whole, the maintenance of absolute control of the �ir above 
convoy routes will be a .difficult task to accomplish because of the 
inordinate effort required to screen shipping again�t lqi:tg-range 
reconnaissance aircraft. It should be possible, however, to de­
f end merchant convoys against direct attack by land-based planes 
by the provision of escort carriers in waters where danger of en­
emy air attack exists. In the narrow seas, withi:ri close range of 
enemy air bases, heavy covering forces consisting of carriers and 
gunfire ships will doubtless be required to fight the convoys through. 
Our experience in the Mediterranean during the last war indicates, 
however, that merchant convoys can be moved ih the presence of 
strong land-based air, provided carrier-borne aircraft is supplied in 
adequate strength. 
This leads us to a consideration of the carrier task force as 
the primary weapon of naval warfare. As you know, the fleet ac­
tions of Midway and the Coral Sea marked the beginning of a new 
era in naval warfare and confirmed the aircraft carrier as the real 
capital ship of the future. It is the most powerful offensive weapon 
we have. The big-gun ship has now assumed primarily the status 
of a surface escort for the carrier, although it has other uses. As 
the war in the Pacific progressed, the striking power of carrier 
aircraft against objectives other than enemy fleets was forcibly 
demonstrated. Indeed, so effective did carriers prove in securing 
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local control of the air at heavily defended land targets that surface 
operations until then conceived as impracticable were confidently 
planned and successfully carried out. 
The aircraft carrier derives its value from a number of tacti­
cal qualities, but it possesses one feature that transcends all the 
others: It is a mobile base that can be brought close enough to 
enemy targets. to launch aircraft with their optimum fighting ca­
pabilities unimpaired. Of course, the fact that carriers may be 
concentrated, and thus multiply their effectiveness; that they may 
be employed with surprise; that they may cruise for long periods 
in distant waters; and that they have great flexibility as to the 
targets against which they may be employed; all these, too, are 
important. But the ability to operate aircraft at short ranges­
which the carrier imparts-is the unique feature that is unmatched 
in any other weapon of aerial warfare. The carrier sends up an 
aircraft with a minimum fuel load compared to that of land planes 
that must be launched from more distant bases. Hence, it can 
devote a greater portion of its carrying capacity to offensive and 
defensive weapons, and it can be employed with greater frequency 
since it has a shorter distance to fly. These advantages combine to 
increase the striking power of carrier aircraft, not directly with 
the decrease in range to the target, but more on the order of a 
geometrical proportion with the decrease in range. 
All of these tactical features add up to provide for Allied 
sea-air power a strategic advantage that cannot be offset by its 
opponent. By means of air-sea task forces employed in adequate 
strength, we should be able to overwhelm the enemy at any 
point within reach of our carrier-borne aircraft. It is this ability 
that has in the past permitted us to paralyze enemy defenses at 
the end of a long overseas movement of amphibious forces. It is 
this ability which, I trust, will in the future permit the support 
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and retention of overseas positions we may need to drive the war 
home to the enemy. 
I think we may accept it as a sound military principle 
that when one component of the nation's armed force has been as­
signed a specific task, it should be free to investigate the nature 
of that task against the background of its own peculiar talents and 
experience. Only by this means will it be able competently to de­
termine how best to do the job it has been given. 
Now, the Navy has been allocated those tasks that require 
the use of weapons peculiar to sea-air power. Nobody disputes 
that. These tasks do not involve the direct participation of any 
other service. One of them is to employ the striking power of 
carrier-based air against certain enemy targets that can be 
reached from the sea. Accordingly, the Navy has put its best 
brains and its most experienced officers to work on the problem of 
how most effectively to employ carrier-based air against the op­
position we may expect in the future. This is a technical problem 
that requires solution by persons who are by training and ex­
perience intimately acquainted with all the factors involved. I think 
you will agree that such knowledge and experience can best be ob­
tained from within the Navy itself. 
Briefly stated, it has been the result of the Navy's investi­
gation of this problem that we cannot expect to overcome deter­
mined opposition at all enemy targets that are vulnerable to sea­
air attack unless we employ the most advanced types of aircraft 
that are available to us. We are aware of developments in Soviet 
aviation and along other lines of anti-aircraft defense. There can 
be 110 doubt these measures would have a high degree of effect­
iveness against the aircraft for which our present carriers were 
built. 
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But we, too, have made corresponding advances in the art 
of aircraft design and construction. We can build planes today 
that we believe will out-perform anything the Soviets will have 
in the foreseea}?le future. These are the planes we will, need if 
we are successfully to exploit the unique weapon of sea-air power. 
Unfortunately, we cannot adapt our present-day carriers­
which, as you know, were designed under conditions of the last 
war-to the new high-performance aircraft without sacrificing some 
of their most valuable performance qualities. The Navy should 
be free to build the carriers it needs to carry and operate the planes 
necessary for it to carry out.its mission. 
We must, I feel, remain keenly alert to changing tactical 
and technological conditions that dictate changes in strategic con­
cepts. Hardly a month passed during the last war but what some 
naval developnient, however minor, contributed its small influence 
to large revisions in our strategic thinking. 
One of the most · significant of these developments was the 
operation of carrier task forces relatively independent of forward 
bases. In past wars, the radius of action of naval forces was de­
termined by the availability of bases-or at least of coaling sta­
tions-in advanced areas where the fleet sought to operate. Bases 
have traditionally been one of· the essential components since 
fleets acquired freedom of mobility with the advent of steam. The 
sea power of Great Britain was magnified an<l reinforced by heP 
numerous naval stations in all the oceans of the world. Th.ese 
bases made it possible for Britain to extend the range of her 
. fleets; and they, in turn, depended on the Fleet for security and 
protection against overseas attack. Until World War II, it was ac­
cepted as axiomatic by naval strategists that no nation could aspire 
to control of sea areas far distant from the homeland unless she 
had access to bases in waters where the fleet was to, be employed; 
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Today, that is changed. In World War II, we were faced;with 
a situation in the Pacific that threatened severely to limit ,�he 
striking power of the naval weapon. We lacked· bases in waters 
where we hadto carry the fight to the enemy. So we made our bases 
mobile, and we took them where we pleased. As a result, our fleets 
are today virtually independent of overseas bases. The flexibility 
of the sea�air weapon has been multiplied, and for limited periods 
we are able to bring to bear the full striking power of the Fleet in 
waters wherever ships can sail. 
The strategic implications of this naval development I ani 
sure are not lost on you. What we are now able to -do is to bring to 
bear the full strength of our sea-air power where and when we wish 
and to maintain the pressure for prolonged periods of time. 
Of course, advanced bases still are of great value. They 
serve two main purposes. First, we need locations in forward areas 
where we can send ships for repair of battle damage that would 
otherwise require a long trip to shipyards in the rear, !:1-nd we need 
them also to patch up heavily damaged ships so that the voyage 
home may be made in safety. Secondly, we need advanced ports 
where stores and ammunition can be transferred from incoming 
cargo ships to the specially constructed logistics ships that. work in 
the fleet. But neither of these functions requires an establishment 
on shore. The facilities needed for the operation of an advanced base, 
including major ship repair, may be entirely waterborne. Thus, 
any protected anchorage favorably situated with respect to the zone 
of combat may be placed into use as a floating base just as soon 
as the specialized logistics ships can be brought forward. 
Now, before closing, I want to touch briefly on the atomic 
bomb and what it means to the future of naval warfare. I think 
it is safe to say that nuclear fission has had an impact on existing 
theories of warfare more severe than any other new weapon in his-
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tory. It has radically disturbed our pre-conceived notions involving 
the disposition of forces and the principles of concentration and 
mass. Paradoxically enough, we, who first developed the bomb, 
have suffered most by the upsets it has produced in the technique 
of warfare. 
Our military experience in World War II was gained at 
enormous cost. In the field of naval warfare, we 'battled our way 
slowly and painfully from Pearl Harbor to Okinawa, meanwhile 
gai_ning a "know-how" in the use of naval weapons that is un­
matched by any nation in the world. But at the very end of the 
war a new, more powerful weapon appeared that now threatens 
to undo much of what we have learned. 
The influence atomic weapons will have on maritime strategy, 
however, is not yet clearly defined. For the present, we must ad­
just ourselves to this situation just as we have in the past, when 
�ew means of attack have seemed to render obsolete ships and 
weapons then . in use. Naval· history is replete with instances 
where some new weapan has threatened to make the ship no long­
er an effective instrument for controlling the seas. When the ex­
plosive shell supplanted a solid shot for use against the wooden man­
of-war, . pessimistic observers were convinced great ships could 
never stand up against this. terrible new weapon. But shortly 
afterward, the ironclad ship made its appearance; and sea control 
continued to be exercised, as U�\lal, by the · Power having the 
largest fleet of heavy ships. When the Whitehead torpedo was 
introduced, it seemed evident the death of the capital ship was 
at hand. So convinced were the French of this fact that they 
temporarily gave up the building of large ships in favor o� small 
torpedo boats, each able to launch a lethal attack upon a battle­
ship. But it turned out that these small craft could reach their 
targets only under favorable conditions of sea and weather, and 
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that they were highly vulnerable to the defensive fire of their 
ponderous opponents. Moreover, improvements in underwater pro­
tection tended to redress the balance in favor of the ship. With 
the advent of the airplane, it appeared certain to most advocates 
of air power that large ships would become easy prey to aircraft 
able to launch against them bombs weighing five hundred or a 
thousand pounds. Instead, the present day capital ship-with its 
powerful anti-aircraft weapons, under radar control and firing in­
fluence-fuzed shells augmented by its own air coverage-has be­
come an extremely tough target, even to large flights of aircraft. 
And so it goes. I think the lesson to be learned here was 
best expressed by Mahan when he cautioned against being too 
quick in discarding the old as well as too slow in adopting the new. 
We know, of course, that a single atomic bomb will destroy 
a single ship. But we know also that fighting ships underway and 
suitably dispersed will suffer but slightly from an atomic explosion, 
except by direct hit. This would seem to make the use of atomic 
bombs against mobile forces extremely doubtful. 
On the other hand, heavy concentration of ships in ports or 
amphibious operations might off er suitable and worthwhile targets. 
The present answer seems to be greater dispersion and control of 
the air over the vital areas. It is not beyond reason that we shall 
in the future evolve a defense against the atomic bomb that will 
prove effective. 
Now as to push button warfare, including rockets, jet pro­
pelled bombs, guided missiles, etc., fortunately, the solution of that 
problem seems very remote. At best they probably will never be pre­
cision weapons and whether or not they will be used against mo­
bile naval forces is problematical. As you know, counter measures 
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are being devised but have not yet been overly successful. It is a 
problem which is of vital importance to all the armed services. 
In conclusion, gentlemen, if there is one single thought I 
should like to leave with you, it is this: Command of the sea is 
vital to us in war. I think that summarizes all I have- had to say. 
Unless we have command of the sea, our war-making force must re­
main based within our continental borders. Without it, we cannot 
support our allies, and we shall be left to face the enemy alone. 
It is the job of the Navy to provide that command. The 
Navy by itself cannot win a war. But the Navy alone can create 
conditions without which victory cannot be possible. Those 
conditions are these: to make safe for our use the sea lanes we 
-need and to deny to the enemy the S!ea lanes he must use to 
fight the war against us. 
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